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from the court. 
1. EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES: A COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN READING
AND STATING REPORTED CASES, COMPOSING HEAD-NOTES AND BRIEFS, CRITICIZING AND
COMPARING AUTHORITIES, AND COMPILING DIGESTS 109 (1894).  
2. The latest round of this debate concerned the nomination of Harold Koh as legal advisor
to the State Department.  See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, The Long Arm of the Law,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/194651 (asserting that
“[w]ere [Koh’s] writings to become policy, judges might have the power to use debatable
interpretations of treaties and ‘customary international law’ to override a wide array of federal
and state laws affecting matters as disparate as the redistribution of wealth and prostitution.”);
The Opinionator: The Fight Over the Harold Koh Nomination: A Field Guide, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2009, available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/the-fight-over-the-
harold-koh-nomination-a-field-guide/ (citing Koh critics as claiming that Koh will “use
American courts to import international law to override the policies adopted through the
processes of representative government.”).  But see Bruce Ackerman, The Demonization of
Harold Koh, DAILY BEAST, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/
2009-04-07/the-demonization-of-harold-koh/?cid=tag:all1 (“Conservatives should recognize
that they lost the election, and that the State Department will indeed return the country to its
traditional role as a leading advocate of international law.”).  The debate is also renewed every
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TOWARD A THEORY OF PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY
CHAD FLANDERS*
As a court attaches some weight to any of the matters herein
described as of imperative authority or of persuasive authority or
of quasi-authority, and as a court has it in its power to disregard
even imperative authority, the question naturally arises whether the
attempted distinctions between the kinds of authority are not wholly
imaginary, or at least unimportant.1
In the ongoing—and by now increasingly tired—debate over foreign
authority, little attention, if any at all, has been paid to the idea of persuasive
authority.   This is puzzling because so much in that debate seems, if only2
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348075
56 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:55
time a Supreme Court Justice makes even a stray comment on the advisability or inadvisability
of citing to foreign authorities, which seems to be every six months or so.  Most recently, it has
been Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  See Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views of Influence of
Foreign Law on Her Court, and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14 (quoting Justice
Ginsburg as asking “Why shouldn’t we look to the wisdom of a judge from abroad with at least
as much ease as we would read a law review article written by a professor?”).  The Sotomayor
confirmation hearings have also reignited the debate.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Analysis:
S o t o m a y o r  o n  F o r e i g n  L a w ,  N . Y .  T I M E S ,  J u l y  1 7 ,  2 0 0 9 ,
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/analysis-sotomayor-on-foreign-law/ (collecting
Sotomayor’s statements on the role of international law in judicial decision making).
3. See the spot-on assessment of the debate regarding the use of foreign authorities in
Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 63, 67 (2007) (“This particular debate is like two ships passing each other at
night.  One side accuses the Court of giving up our sovereignty; the other side simply denies it
with a shrug, as if wondering why anyone would ever think such a silly thing.”); see also
Melissa A. Waters, Getting Beyond the Crossfire Phenomenon: A Militant Moderate’s Take on
the Role of Foreign Authority in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 635, 636
(2008) (“Like the old CNN news commentary program, the Crossfire debate on foreign
authority that has developed since Roper is great fun to watch, but often completely unedifying
from the perspective of learning anything substantive about the complex issues involved.”). 
XXFor a good expression of the worry that foreign authorities are being used as binding
authorities, see Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, An American Amendment, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
475, 476-77 (2009) (“When the Supreme Court declares that the Constitution evolves—and that
foreign law effects its evolution—it is declaring nothing less than the power of foreign
governments to change the meaning of the United States Constitution.” (citation omitted)).  
4. It is certainly possible to imagine a regime where the court might, but only as a
courtesy, cite those persons who influenced it in its reasoning.  
implicitly, to rely on assumptions about what persuasive authority is.  Those
who favor citing to decisions in foreign courts will often defend the practice
by pointing to the established practice of citing authorities that are “merely
persuasive.”  The idea that some authority is “persuasive” is then contrasted
with authorities that are mandatory or binding and which have their authority
by virtue of something else besides their persuasiveness—for example,
because they are the rulings of a higher court or are decisions made by the
same court in the past.  Foreign authorities, the argument goes, are merely
“persuasive” and are not binding and as such can be cited insofar as they are
helpful and illuminating to the issue.  Because they do not bind, they do not
raise the specter of being ruled by a foreign country, as some fear.  3
But very little has been said to explicate the very idea of persuasive
authority itself, in its own right: Why indeed should there be any such thing?
Why shouldn’t there simply be the authority of higher courts and the court’s
past opinions, plus the court’s own reasoning and interpretation?   Further,4
what entitles a source—whether it be a decision of a foreign court, a blog
entry, a law review article, or a treatise—to count as a persuasive authority?
2009] TOWARD A THEORY OF PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY 57
5. Lee, supra note 3; Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119
HARV. L. REV. 129 (2006).
6. Waldron, supra note 5, at 129.
7. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 3.
8. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35 (1986). 
9. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931 (2008) [hereinafter
Schauer, Authority].
Are some sources, either by virtue of their merit or their status as a kind of
source, generally more persuasive than others?  The obviousness of these
questions, coupled with the lack of any clear answers to them—still less any
theory that might generate answers to them—shows the extent to which we are
still in the dark as to the nature of persuasive authority.  
Fortunately, some recent scholarship in two areas has indirectly contributed
to the understanding of persuasive authority.  The first, as already noted, is the
debate over the use of foreign authorities.  Several commentators, including
Jeremy Waldron and Youngjae Lee, have used this debate as occasion to
discuss the grounding of persuasive authority.   But these discussions have5
been limited because the citation of foreign authority is, in many ways, a
special case of the use of persuasive authority (if it is a use of persuasive
authority at all, and not binding authority, as some have contended).  Foreign
authorities may be problematic in ways that other persuasive authorities, such
as treatises or law review articles or other domestic courts, are not; at least
there is the perception that there is a salient difference, which the
commentators are eager to explain, or to explain away.  Waldron, for instance,
is concerned to see the citation of foreign authorities as part of citation to the
“law of nations.”   Whatever merits this may have as an explanation for the6
citation of foreign authorities, it cannot serve as a general explanation of all
instances of persuasive authority.  And Lee’s essay focuses on the use of
foreign authorities in an even more narrow context: the citation of foreign
courts in the U.S. Supreme Court’s death penalty cases.7
A second body of scholarship relevant to the question of persuasive
authority is the literature discussing judicial authority in general—such as the
questions concerning the bindingness of precedent.  Joseph Raz  is widely
cited and discussed in this context.   And Frederick Schauer has recently8
written at length and illuminatingly on the citation of “authority” in judicial
opinions in the Virginia Law Review, where he includes a discussion of
persuasive authority.   But this literature again fails to treat persuasive9
authority independently as a subject of interest in its own right, and instead
views it as collateral to the main question of the nature of judicial authority in
general.  Although I frequently engage Schauer’s paper in my own essay, he
is more interested than I am in the general question of citation of authority, and
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10. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989);
Anthony Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); Gary Lawson, The
Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994); Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
11. I connect some of the themes in this essay to general questions of “judicial authority”
in my review of Richard Posner’s How Judges Think.  See Chad Flanders, Review, RICHARD
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, 3 LAW & HUMANITIES 118 (2009).   
12. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111 (1977) (explaining the idea
of the “gravitational pull” of precedent).
he does not focus solely on the unique challenges that persuasive authority
presents.  Still less does the literature on precedent and stare decisis (which I
treat as a subset of the literature on legal authority) treat persuasive authority
as anything other than a side show.   These papers investigate the question of10
what makes other opinions of the same court or higher courts “binding” and
hence are less interested in what might make other sources merely
“persuasive.”  But the latter is no less of a puzzle, I submit, than the former.
The latter puzzle has simply been less explored.
This essay is written in the belief that persuasive authority is an interesting
phenomenon in its own right.  But I also believe that focusing on persuasive
authority separate from other debates can yield dividends in the debate over
the citation of foreign authority as well as in the study of judicial authority.11
The plan of this essay is as follows.  In Part I, I express and explicate what I
take to be the two major conventional beliefs about persuasive authority: that
it includes all those sources that are not binding and that the “bindingness” of
persuasive authority lies in its ability to persuade.  In Part II, I try to
problematize the accepted wisdom.  In practice, there is a division of
persuasive authority, beyond the simple “anything that is not mandatory or
binding authority.”  There is, in fact, a hierarchy of persuasive authority.  As
a purely descriptive matter, decisions from other courts outside the jurisdiction
of the deciding court are treated as having more weight than other
authorities—such as law review articles or treatises.  
This descriptive insight yields a theoretical hypothesis, developed in Part
III of my essay, which is that other courts tend to have an authority that is
derived from something more than their mere persuasiveness.  If this is correct,
then it is also not true that persuasive authority has authority only by virtue of
the merits of its reasoning.  At least compared to other sources, some
sources–like courts–may also be authoritative by virtue of what they are, as
opposed to what they say. 
The underlying explanation for this “gravitational pull”  that courts can12
have on one another is similar to the pull a court’s own past decisions will
have on it.  Just as one court seeks to be united with its own past decisions, so
2009] TOWARD A THEORY OF PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY 59
13. Schauer, Authority, supra note 9, at 1934.  
14. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).
15. Id. (“A district court bound by circuit authority, for example, has no choice but to
follow it, even if convinced that such authority was wrongly decided.”).  
16. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249 (2006).
17. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).  
too may courts generally seek to make their decisions consistent with other
courts.  I hope to demonstrate that the difference between the respect owed to
precedential decisions and that owed to decisions with a merely persuasive
authority turns out to be more a difference in degree than a difference in kind.
In making this conclusion, I am in agreement with Frederick Schauer, who
writes that “something as seemingly trivial as citation practice turns out to be
the surface manifestation of a deeply important facet of the nature of law
itself.”   Such is the case, I believe, with persuasive authority.13
I. The Conventional Picture of Persuasive Authority
A.  Binding Authority: Precedent and Stare Decisis
It will be best to introduce the conventional wisdom on the subject of
persuasive authority by rehearsing what I hope are some familiar facts about
authority that is “binding.”  Begin with the idea that decisions of a higher court
in the United States constitutional system are binding on lower courts.  Call
this, following custom, “precedent.”   According to this familiar notion, lower14
courts must follow the decisions of the higher court on an identical matter.15
Of course, it will often be difficult to discern when the higher court has ruled
on an identical matter: problems regarding distinguishing holding and dicta
emerge here,  but the basic principle is clear.  At the very least, a lower court16
that does not follow the decision of a higher court on a similar matter will
virtually guarantee that its decision will be overturned on appeal, should there
be an appeal.  But that is only to state the issue as a merely predictive (i.e.,
descriptive) matter.   This would surely understate the normative force that17
precedent is supposed to have in our system: a lower court that does not follow
the higher court’s binding precedent has done something wrong as a legal
matter.  It has not discharged its role properly as a lower court.  Thus, it is not
simply that the court has done something which will, as a predictive matter,
lead to the overturning of its judgment.  A judgment which does not follow the
higher court precedent is simply incorrect, even if it is not the subject of an
appeal.  By stressing this normative aspect, I mean to show how the higher
court has authority over the lower court, and that this authority is not merely
a matter of power, or at least it is not considered to be merely a matter of
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18. See, for example, the discussion of legality in RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES
168-71 (2006). 
19. I will suggest that this simple picture needs revision later in my essay.  See infra Part
III.
20. For a discussion of the “dead hand” problem, see Michael W. McConnell, Textualism
and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1998). 
21. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (“In this case we may
enquire whether Roe’s central rule has been found unworkable; whether the rule’s limitation
on state power could be removed without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or
significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it . . . .”).  
power.  It is a matter of following the law, or of “legality,” and legality is a
normative principle.18
Closely related to this—at least in the conventional picture —is the idea of19
stare decisis.  On this picture, at least on a first approximation, a single court
is bound by the past decisions on relevantly similar matters of the same court.
So where the picture of precedent is one in which higher constrains lower, the
picture of stare decisis is one of the past constraining the present.  For the
Supreme Court, there is no higher authority, so all that binds it is its past
decisions.  The idea is that the past court stands in the same relation to the
present court as a higher court stands to a lower court.  
This is not quite right, though, because a court can change its mind.  The
dead hand of the court’s own past  is not totally binding in the same way that20
the command of a higher court is binding on a lower court.  The question of
when and why it can change is a vexed and mysterious one (and we will
consider some of its mysteries below, in Part III).  In the case of stare decisis,
we seem not to be dealing with metaphors of the inexorable command of a
superior, but with a metaphor of weight: the past decisions of the same court
on similar matters should be given great weight, so that strong reasons need
to be brought to bear to depart from that decision.  The somewhat shaky nature
of the force of past decisions can be seen by the need to shore up the doctrine
of stare decisis with considerations such as the desire for stability or
uniformity across time.   Such considerations do not, and should not, apply21
in cases of applying precedent: the decision of the higher court may be
cumbersome and awkward (not to mention false) and create confusion and
uncertainty, but these factors do not give the lower court license to depart from
the decision of the higher court.
We can say this, for now, knowing that we will return to this issue later: at
least for the run of the mill case, the past decision of the same court will be
binding on it in much the same way that the decision of a higher court would
be.  That is, it will function as if it were an inexorable command, simply to be
followed and not revisited—not examined on the basis of its merits, but simply
taken as given and as already decided.  Even in the more complicated case, the
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22. This is perhaps most common in unpublished opinions, where the facts of the individual
case are thought to be so governed by a prior decision of the court that it is sufficient to simply
cite that past decision and add little in the way of discussion.  For a discussion of this use of
precedent in unpublished opinions, see Chad Flanders, Sotomayor and the Art of the Judicial
Deal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 15, 2009, at A13.
23. See, e.g., State v. Hickman, 68 P.3d 418, 426 (Ariz. 2003) (noting that respect for
precedent demands that the court “not lightly overrule precedent” and only do so “for
compelling reasons” and that “any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special
justification.”).  
24. It is not automatically a legal error because it could be assumed that the court has
overruled the prior precedent sub silentio.  I am grateful for discussions with John Fonstad and
Michael Bern on this point.
25. Again, I am laying out only the received wisdom on the subject, which I will go on to
challenge later in this essay.
26. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n the absence of
binding precedent . . . a court may forge a different path than suggested by prior authorities that
have considered the issue.”).
past decision exerts some weight, so that reasons will have to be brought to
bear to show why departure from the past case is warranted.  In short, stare
decisis has a dual aspect: a court’s own past decision (1) can be treated as
absolutely binding and perhaps simply cited without comment,  or else (2) it22
can be treated as having a great weight.  
But although stare decisis does have this dual aspect, at least one of those
aspects shows it to be very clearly in the same category of “bindingness” as
precedent is.  And the second aspect, too, shows the strength of a past decision,
even if that strength is not total, so that it simply forecloses any further
discussion.  There is at least some extra hurdle to be overcome if the court
determines that the past decision should be departed from; it cannot simply be
noted and then departed from, it must receive an acknowledgment and rebuttal,
showing why the decision no longer has any force.   To fail to do so would23
also be a legal error: to fail to address a relevant and similar decision made
earlier by the same court would render the decision at the very least defective
and possibly mistaken—an inferior opinion, from the legal point of view.24
B. Persuasive Authority
  By contrast, persuasive authority has neither of these elements; persuasive
authority does not “bind” nor does a court need to reckon with it because of
the gravitational pull it exerts or the weight that it has.   Persuasive authority,25
to start, has no independent binding force; no court is bound to follow the
dictates of an authority that is merely persuasive.   Nor does persuasive26
authority, unlike decisions that have been made by the same court earlier, have
weight that needs to be acknowledged and addressed just because of the type
62 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:55
27. In fact, persuasive authorities need not be decisions from another court at all.  
28. Hence the rule in many jurisdictions that parties have to present authorities from the
court that are directly contrary to their position.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
3.3(a)(2) (2007) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”).
29. Timothy Schwartz, Comment, Cases Time Forgot: Why Judges Can Sometimes Ignore
Controlling Precedent, 56 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1479 (2007).
30. Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148,
156 (2005) (“The Court thus chooses to treat foreign law as authoritative in Joseph Raz’s sense:
It treats the mere fact that foreign jurisdictions condemn the juvenile death penalty as a reason
to condemn that practice in the United States.”); see also H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY (1982); Vlad F. Perju, The Puzzling Parameters of the
Foreign Law Debate, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 167, 179 (“The authority of a legal norm is content-
independent when it does not depend on that norm’s background justification.”).  
31. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 502-03
(2000) (arguing that persuasive authority is “material . . . regarded as relevant to the decision
which has to be made by the judge, but . . . not binding on the judge under the hierarchical rules
of the national system determining authoritative sources”).  
of decision it is.   A court need not mention any contrary persuasive authority27
unless it wants to; whereas a court would be mistaken, perhaps even mistaken
as a matter of law, if a previous decision is contrary to the present one.   And28
this gives us at least the beginnings of what I want to claim is the first accepted
truth about persuasive authority: persuasive authority is any authority which
is not binding on courts.  Or as one commentator put it, “[t]he touchstone of
persuasive authority is that the deciding court is not required to follow [the]
result or reasoning of the referenced authority.”29
Here we are in a better position to see what this means because binding can
mean being authoritative, as with precedent, or it can mean being required to
give it consideration, as with stare decisis.  Borrowing Ernest Young’s recent
analysis of authority (which in turn borrows from Joseph Raz), we can say that
cases that have a mandatory or binding authority are authoritative just by
virtue of what they are, rather than what they say.   A court must follow a30
decision relevant and on point by a higher court, and a court must at least
consider and weigh—if only ultimately to reject—a past decision it has made.
Precedent and stare decisis bind a court by virtue of pedigree, not solely by
virtue of the merits of the cases decided.  Persuasive authority does not bind
in this way, and this gives us its first definition: authority that does not bind
intrinsically.31
Now, we will shortly get to what remains of persuasive authority’s
“authority” when it is defined by not being binding: this may seem to indicate
it is not an authority at all, if it is only authoritative by virtue of what it says
2009] TOWARD A THEORY OF PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY 63
32. See HART, supra note 30; RAZ, supra note 8.  
33. In their recent book, Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner suggest that dicta from the same
court should have a higher place than this in a ranking of persuasive authority.  ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 53
(2008).  I disagree.  Dicta is too close to binding authority—and may actually be binding
authority, given the slippery distinction between dicta and holding.  Wambaugh seems to be
closest to the mark when he deems dicta as “quasi-authority.”  WAMBAUGH, supra note 1, at
103 (dicta “does tend to affect the decision of a subsequent case”).  A harder example is a
decision by the same court on an analogous matter.  Is this to be considered along the lines of
a holding, or as only persuasive?  (I am grateful to David Pozen for this example.)  But for the
time being, I can bracket such cases, as I am only interested in a hierarchy of what is
conventionally agreed to be persuasive authority.      
34. There may be disagreement on this point.  For some, legislative history may not be
persuasive, but something more than this: it may be authoritative on matters of interpretation.
I put this possible disagreement to one side for now.  
35. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000).
rather than what it is.   But I want for the moment simply to focus on the32
negative aspect of persuasive authority—defining it by what it is not—and to
provide some paradigmatic examples of authorities that are only persuasive.
In principle, subject to the constraints of being “authoritative” (whatever
this turns out to mean), the set of persuasive authorities could be nearly
limitless.  The class of authorities that are binding is very small relative to the
number of things that are non-binding.  And what types of sources could be
persuasive to a given judge is an open question.  
But in practice, things turn out to be different.  Not anything and everything
is cited as persuasive authority.  To orient ourselves, we can make a
preliminary list of sources that are cited that are nonetheless non-binding on
courts.  I offer this list in a rough order to indicate what I believe to be, as an
empirical matter, the frequency of use of these sources.  I will try to suggest
later (in Part II) that there is more than simply an empirical grounding for this
“ordering” of sources, and that it may also reflect a hierarchy of sorts among
persuasive authorities.  The important thing about this list, for the moment, is
just that it contains those things which are not binding on courts, but to which
courts, in the course of their reasoning, sometimes refer.
1. Other courts outside of the court’s own jurisdiction, whether other circuit
courts or other state courts (majority and concurring opinions).33
2. The laws of other states or of the federal government and agency
regulations.
3. Legislative history or debates, especially if the question is one of
statutory interpretation.   34
4. Restatements of the law, such as the Restatement of Torts or Contracts.
5. Treatises, such as Lawrence Tribe’s American Constitutional Law.35
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36. We could make a further distinction here between articles authored by faculty, and
notes and comments authored by students.  I thank Jason Childress for this point.  
37. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
38. See Lee, supra note 3, at 68 (“A quote from a Shakespeare play may sometimes be
‘relevant’ in a judicial opinion in some weak, uncontroversial sense.”); see, e.g., Doe v. State,
189 P.3d 999, 1009 (Alaska 2008) (quoting Anatole France’s dictum on “the majestic equality
of the laws” (ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 75 (The Modern Library 1917) (1894)).  
39.  See, e.g., United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 303, n.42 (Mass. 2006)
(citing a blog posting by Dan Markel); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 484 F.3d 436,
438 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, J., dissenting) (using statistics taken from Wikipedia).
40. Ronald Dworkin, interestingly, would likely put moral principles as part of “binding”
law, rather than as merely persuasive.  Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L.
REV. 14, 45 (1967).  Moral principles were, of course, part of the common law.  See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Mochan, 110 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa. Super. 1955) (“Any act is indictable at
common law which from its nature scandalously affects the morals or health of the
community.”).  
41. The last three are suggested by Schauer in Authority and Authorities.  Schauer,
Authority, supra note 9, at 1947.  I deliberately leave off this list foreign courts.  This is an
obviously controversial example, which some might put under “forbidden authorities,” but
which others might put very high on the list.  
XXI have also left dissenting court opinions off of the list.  These may be discouraged sources;
on the other hand, in some cases, they may be as persuasive as the majority or concurring
opinion of a court.  
42. There is, of course, the exception of when a higher court cites a lower court as
persuasive authority.  These are in the same jurisdiction, but the lower court does not bind the
higher court.  See Akil Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV.
145, 150 (2008) (discussing the use by Justice Stevens of the “persuasive authority” of the
“general views of lower courts”).   
6. Law review articles, notes, and comments.36
7. Other academic sources, such as book-length treatments of an issue (e.g.,
John Rawls’s Theory of Justice ) or empirical or economic studies of a certain37
matter.  
8. General interest sources (books, periodicals, and possibly literary
sources ).38
9.  General news sources (newspapers and magazines).
10. Internet sources, including blogs.39
11. Moral principles themselves, such as the golden rule or the idea of
equality.40
12. Discouraged, but in principle possible sources: memorandum opinion
and judgments, the Bible, the National Enquirer, the judge’s father-in-law.41
All of these are sources that courts might cite, but are not binding on the
courts.  Citations to other courts are not binding because they are from places
other than the court’s own jurisdiction.   The binding authority these decisions42
may have in their own jurisdiction (their own state or own circuit or own
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43. See Schauer, Authority, supra note 9, at 1940 (“[H]ere a court is conventionally
understood to be following only those decisions or conclusions whose reasoning the court finds
persuasive.”).  
44. See, e.g., WAMBAUGH, supra note 1, at 103 (“The weight given to dicta and the like is
dependent largely upon the learning and reputation of the utterer.  Some old text books have
very great weight; and so have the dicta of some famous judges.”).  
45. Waldron, supra note 5, at 152 (“The hallmark of persuasive authority is engagement
with the reasons for a practice or a decision rather than the counting of noses.”).  
46. HABERMAS: A CRITICAL READER 34 (Peter Dews ed., 1999); see also H. Patrick Glenn,
Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 263 (1987) (defining persuasive authority as
“authority which attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it”).  I should emphasize here that
rational argument is not the only way something can persuade.  A decision may make appeals
to our emotions or our shared humanity.  These appeals may not, strictly speaking, be “rational”
and instead may work on a person’s emotions.  So, too, might a book persuade by virtue of its
aesthetic power, and not its purely rational power.     
nation) does not extend to any other jurisdiction.  Therefore, although they are
binding authorities in one aspect, they are not binding authorities when a court
from outside their jurisdiction cites them.  The lack of bindingness of sources
4-12 is even more obvious.  A restatement of the law is composed by people,
some of whom may be judges, but the restatement itself does not establish or
promulgate a rule over anyone.  Nor does a treatise, however eminent the
author.  And articles, novels, or blogs have no power to bind.
Given our first statement about persuasive authority, we know what unites
these sources, at least partly, is what they are not: all of them share the feature
of not being binding on the courts who cite them.  No court is required to obey
or even to confront Rawls’s Theory of Justice, or even an article written on a
case in the same jurisdiction that is well-written, insightful, and on-point.  But
we can also say something positive about them according to the conventional
understanding of persuasive authority.  Even though these sources do not have
any power over courts by virtue of what they are (a source that is intrinsically
authoritative), they still can have a power by virtue of what they say, if they
say it persuasively.   43
In other words, if one of these sources makes an argument that a judge or
court finds convincing, then to that extent, the source has some authority over
the judge—whether that authority means that the judge should follow it
because the reasoning is compelling, or merely that the judge has to take it into
account.   The important thing about the source’s authority is that it is not a44
matter of will or fiat, it is a matter of persuasiveness, or even of
reasonableness.   In Habermas’s winning phrase, the force of persuasive45
authority is the unforced force of the better argument.   Habermas’s46
formulation is particularly apt because it manages to capture the somewhat
paradoxical idea that an authority could be authoritative merely by virtue of
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47. I am grateful to Alex Potapov for stressing this point to me.  
48. Being an authority, however, does become relevant when we see that the desire for
uniformity can give actual authorities a greater weight.  See the discussion infra Part III.   
49. See Schauer, Authority, supra note 9, at 1941 (“[O]nce we understand that genuine
authority is content-independent, we are in a position to see that persuasion and acceptance
(whether voluntarily or not) of authority are fundamentally opposed notions.”).  
50. See CHARLES LARMORE, THE MORALS OF MODERNITY 95 (1996) (discussing the feeling
of “responding to reason”).
51. There is of course a deeper comparative question here which for the moment I am
bracketing: how does authority function in philosophical or scientific reasoning, as opposed to
legal reasoning?  Richard Posner makes the blanket statement that “authority and hierarchy play
a role in law that would be inimical to scientific inquiry.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 62 (1990).  But this may rely on an over-idealized image of scientific
inquiry and a skepticism about other forms of practical reasoning.  See Schauer, Authority,
supra note 9, at 1934 n.11.    
its persuasiveness—that there is something about a good argument that exerts
control over us, even a control that is analogous (but perhaps only analogous)
to the command of a superior officer.
Is it puzzling to speak of persuasive authority?  Why not simply persuasive
sources?  Indeed, one might argue that the only persuasive authorities are the
decisions of other courts because they at least have some authority over
something—as opposed to the author of A Theory of Justice.   But even that47
is a bit of a stretch: one jurisdiction has no authority over another, so its
decision has no more power to bind than the words of John Rawls.   So do we48
have persuasive authorities or persuasive sources, because persuasion and
authority are opposed notions?   I am not sure that too much rides on this49
point, at least for the purposes of my argument now.  There is a perfectly
familiar way that we might feel ourselves compelled by a particularly good
argument or way of phrasing something.  It can feel—and this may only be a
feeling—that we are somehow, if only subtly, coerced into accepting the
argument.  It can have the feeling of being subject to an imperative.  We might
feel that we are, in a sense, commanded by reason, and have no choice but to
submit to it.   So to this extent it is not too far off to say that persuasive50
reasons can be authoritative, if only in a metaphorical and not a literal sense.51
But we should be careful to cabin the authority that persuasive authorities
possess.  Suppose that a judge or a court finds a decision of another court
outside of its jurisdiction extremely persuasive, so much so that he finds that
he must follow its logic in the case before him.  Is that decision binding?
However binding it is on the conscience of that judge, it cannot be binding as
a matter of law.  Such are the limits of persuasive authority.  It can have all the
logical, moral, and even emotional power you like, but it can never rise to the
level of having any legal force.  It can only have any legal force once it is
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52.  Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that while it might “bad
form” for a judge to ignore contrary authority “by failing even to acknowledge its existence,”
the court is still free to “forge” its own path).  
53. Frederick Schauer makes the interesting suggestion that sometimes a certain circuit will
be regarded as more authoritative on a certain issue (his example is the Second Circuit on
securities regulation).  Schauer, Authority, supra note 9, at 1958.  Relying on the expertise of
the court, he intimates, is treating that source as a genuinely non-persuasive authority—that is,
using it as a source without regard to the content of its reasoning.  Id.  First off, this does not
distinguish court opinions from other persuasive sources courts may use in an “authoritative”
way (a court may defer to an economist, say, without truly comprehending her methods).
Second, it is not clear that the trust in this case is wholly divorced from the content of the
reasoning.  A court may hearken to the Second Circuit, but it will not follow it simply because
it is the Second Circuit.  In a similar way, a court may pay special attention to a decision by
Richard Posner, but it will not defer to him independently of what he says.  It just means that
the court has previously found Posner a good judge to turn to when facing a difficult problem.
See Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 1203 (2006) (noting that a
“judge . . . may well have her own degree of persuasiveness as a result of her reputation.”).  I
do not think it is the best analysis of these cases that the court will be persuaded by the “fact that
the authority is an authority.”  Schauer, Authority, supra note 9, at 1949.  Rather, the “authority”
will be initially consulted because it/he/she is an authority; the decision to follow that authority,
however, will be based on that authority’s reasons.   See, e.g., Charles v. Lundgren & Assocs.,
P.C., 119 F.3d 739, 742 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Because we have the benefit of the Seventh Circuit’s
cogent analysis, we will not replow plowed ground.  Instead we adopt the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit.” (emphasis added)).  
XXSchauer also says that authorities can be non-persuasively “authoritative” insofar as they
show that such a proposition is more likely because another source has said it first.  Schauer,
Authority, supra note 9, at 1947.  I am not sure that this should count as authority in any sense.
adopted into a decision by the court.  Prior to adoption, it is only as strong or
as weak as its ability to persuade a court or a judge.  Note that this means that
even if the judge thinks that the argument is so powerful as to be unassailable,
the judge makes no legal error if he disregards the argument in writing his own
opinion.   The judge can be faulted for bad (or unpersuasive) reasoning, but52
not for making a legal mistake.53
So we are left with two basic conventional points about persuasive
authority.  First, it is not binding.  It does not have the power to be
authoritative over other courts such that courts must follow it or must give it
weight in their deliberations, no matter what the non-binding decision says.
Second, the authority it holds flows from the persuasive content of the
authority.  A book or article or judicial opinion only compels by what it says,
not by what it is.  To have any legal force, a persuasive authority must be
adopted into a legal decision—and it does so only by persuading a judge or a
court.  I take these two points to be fairly straightforward, and nearly
universally accepted in law review articles and books on legal writing and
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54. Schauer puts the question that motivates this Part colorfully, in the conclusion to his
article on authority: 
Why the Supreme Court and the Congress of the United States but not the
President and Fellows of Harvard College . . . or the editorial board of the New
York Times?  Why the Federal Trade Commission but not the board of directors
of Wal-Mart?  Why Loss & Seligman but not Marx and Engels?  Why the
Harvard Law Review but not the Village Voice?  Why the writings of Thomas
Jefferson but not of Jefferson Davis?
Schauer, Authority, supra note 9, at 1960.  
55. Perhaps not coincidentally, this ranking of sources roughly mirrors the ranking found
in The Bluebook.  See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.4, at 48-51
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).  
56. This was supposedly the case in Bush v. Gore.  See Chad Flanders, Comment, Bush v.
Gore and the Uses of “Limiting,” YALE L.J. 1159, 1166-68 (2007).  
research.  I now want to try to introduce some nuances into them and to slowly
encourage you, if not to reject them, at least to hold them somewhat
qualifiedly and not uncritically.
II. Ranking Persuasive Authorities54
In the previous section, I made a list—admittedly provisional and
incomplete—about various persuasive sources that courts have and could refer
to: other court decisions, law reviews, treatises, blog postings, etc.  The list
was placed in a rough ordering of frequency of use, based on no more
advanced empirical evidence than my own rough sense of citation counts.55
All else being equal, courts are more likely to cite other courts than law review
articles.  What I want to point out is that there is no reason given on the
conventional picture I sketched in the previous part why some sources should
be cited more often than other sources.  On the conventional picture, as I shall
put it, the sources of persuasive authority are undifferentiated: there is no
reason why one kind of source should necessarily be cited more often than any
other kind of source.  Law review comments could have been cited more often
than other court opinions, but they are not.  This is just how it happens to be.
There is no intrinsic reason why court opinions should be considered more
“persuasive” than other sources.
  This conclusion of course has to follow if the only reason why persuasive
authorities have authority is because of their persuasiveness, rather than their
pedigree.  There does not seem to be any reason to assume that court opinions
will always be more persuasive than other sources.  A law review article might
explain an issue and make an argument better than a Supreme Court opinion,
especially one done under time pressure.   And indeed, there is no general56
reason, at least in the conventional story, why a dissent in a court opinion from
another jurisdiction might not have greater persuasive authority than a majority
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57. Lee, supra note 3, at 71.  
58. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law, in
THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 394 (Samual Freedman ed., 2003).
or concurring opinion.  Also, an empirical study by a sociologist might provide
more insight than legislative history could.  A book by Richard Posner could
be more persuasive than an opinion by Judge Richard Posner.  And so on and
so forth.  
The undifferentiated nature of the list—the fact that persuasive authority is
any source that is persuasive—does not give us any reason to make a hierarchy
of sources in any normative sense, but only in the sense that, as a matter of
fact, some sources get cited more often than others.  Indeed, as a matter of
principle, the list should be somewhat fluid.  In some cases, it will be better to
cite an empirical study; in other cases, it will be better to cite a court opinion.
It will all depend on the context, and we should not expect one type of source
to be, as a general matter, more persuasive.  Thus, in the conventional picture,
the repeated citation to other courts is a little anomalous.  Why should courts
have a special priority, if not in any evaluative sense, but on the basis of the
numbers?  Why legal authorities and not “the latest book from Habermas?”57
But this may be too quick.  Perhaps, contrary to the conventional picture
strictly construed but still in the spirit of that picture, we can point to some
general features of some types of sources that show why they tend to be more
persuasive, or at least seem to be so.  We can start near the bottom of the list,
just to get an initial idea of how this could be so.  Books on philosophy for
instance, will less likely persuade, or be found to persuade, because they often
will not directly address the issue that the court faces; or if it does address the
issue, it will not approach it in not exactly the same way.  A general treatise on
justice, for instance, like Rawls’s Theory of Justice, will not always have much
to say about whether one reading of a state regulation will be more correct than
another interpretation.  The considerations adduced by Rawls will simply be
too abstract, and will not admit of any ready translation into the deciphering
of the meaning of a state regulation.  Rawls may at best simply be irrelevant.
This is not to say that in some context Rawls will not be illuminating: for
instance, there is a fair case to be made that Rawls is very useful in
understanding the Equal Protection Clause.   But in the ordinary, banal58
statutory interpretation case, Rawls might not be of much use.
Now let us return to the top of the list, and examine the opinions of courts
from other jurisdictions.  There are a number of things we can say about why
court opinions will likely be found to be more relevant and useful, and hence
more persuasive, than other sources such as a novel or a treatise.   For starters,
we might imagine that courts will routinely face the same type of problems.
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59. It could also discuss a case because it is interesting from a theoretical standpoint.  I am
less interested in an article that approaches a case from this angle. 
60. Again, a law review article may seek to explain the case from the perspective of
economics or philosophy.  But I am not interested in a article such as this.
Whereas Rawls might only speak of justice in the abstract, courts repeatedly
face questions concerning individual liability or questions of contract
interpretation.  Although one case from one court will probably never be
exactly the same as a case from another, there will be certain situations that
repeatedly arise and which parties will litigate in similar ways.  So if one court
is looking to find what another source will say in a similar situation, he may
find it more likely that another court, as opposed to another book or article,
will have faced that situation.  To be sure, what another court says about what
to do in that situation may not be very enlightening.  But it will be more likely
that what the court says could be relevant, and this relevancy would explain,
at least partly, why courts cite other courts so much: they give insight on
situations faced by courts on a regular basis.
More than this, we can say that courts will face like issues with the same
sort of tools that another court has at its disposal.  A court facing an issue,
unlike an article or a book, will have to consider things such as canons of
statutory construction, or questions of whether and when summary judgment
is appropriate.  Such terms are foreign to—taking my favored
example—Rawls’s Theory of Justice.  So a court looking to see whether
summary judgment would be appropriate will not find much help in looking
to works in philosophy or sociology.  Those sources will not confront the issue
with the same techniques, nor, to put it perhaps a better way, will they work
under the same constraints.  That means that the decisions of other courts will
be speaking the same language as the court which seeks to learn from and be
persuaded by it.
Of course, these last two points may not sufficiently narrow our inquiry to
the decisions of other courts.  Law review articles, and especially notes and
comments, may simply be a legal analysis of a case.  A law review article will
also be dealing with a situation that many courts will face—indeed, it could be
precisely because the issue is a common one that the law review article is
seeking to explain it.   And the law review article could also try to deal with59
a case using legal tools and terminology.   This point is well taken, and serves60
to show again the truth in the idea that the realm of persuasive authority is a
relatively fluid one: what kind of source  is persuasive in one instance will not
always be persuasive in another instance.  A court opinion, for the reasons
stated above, will sometimes be helpful to another court, but a law review
article could be helpful for precisely the same reasons.
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61. Although it is possible that a law review article imagines a hypothetical that will be
useful to a court.  Consider, for example, the famous “Rule 4” hypothetical in Guido Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed’s article on property and liability rules.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1120-21 (1972).
62. Jeremy Waldron’s defense of the ius gentium also refers to this aspect.  See Waldron,
supra note 5, at 134 (arguing ius gentium looks “not just to philosophic reason but to what law
had actually achieved in the world”).  
63. Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
807, 811 (2000) (“A scholar, by contrast, is entirely free to offer whatever construct he chooses,
constrained only by the requirements of candor and whatever ambition he may entertain that
his analysis be relevant.”).  
64. Id. at 823 (“[O]ne substantial advantage the judge enjoys over the scholar comes from
the fact that just because the judge exercises power, because her decision directly effects lives,
she will have thought differently and perhaps more deeply, more responsibly.”).  
Still, we should remind ourselves that here we are only looking at why
citations to court opinions will likely be more frequent in the aggregate.  We
are not looking to show that courts will always or should always prefer courts
to other sources.  And surely it pays to point out that there are many more
court opinions than law review articles.  As a result, it is more likely that a
court will find a closer analogy to its own case in another court’s decision
rather than a law review article, especially if the situation at issue is not all that
common.  So, if only by virtue of the fact that there are more court opinions
than law review articles that deal solely with cases, there will be a greater
reliance—in the aggregate—on opinions of other courts.  Note, too, that the
law review article is parasitic on the court opinion: the author of the article is
seeking to explicate a case, not merely a hypothetical.61
But we can say more than this about court opinions and why other courts
rely on them.  Courts have to go through a process that law review authors do
not encounter.  Courts are presented with arguments from two competing sides
(in most cases) and must weigh those arguments.  Moreover, courts have to
make a decision and that decision will actually have consequences in the real
world.   So courts are concerned with the practical effects of their decisions,62
in a way that law review articles generally need not be.   In this way, being an63
authority actually matters, even if that authority is not over another court that
may cite its opinion as a persuasive authority.  A court will have to anticipate
(and eventually deal with) the practical consequences of the decisions it
makes.   Finally, a judge writing an opinion may have to persuade a majority64
of his or her colleagues to agree with her.  This will entail modifying the
judge’s position to anticipate objections, or perhaps even moderating the
decision in order to forge a winning coalition.  An opinion that wins over one
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65. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 156 n.2 (1947) (“Aside from the fact that a
constitutional adjudication of recent vintage and by a divided Court may always be
reconsidered, I am loath to believe that these decisions by less than a majority of the Court are
the last word on issues of such far-reaching importance to constitutional liberties.”); Sullivan,
supra note 53, at 1202 (noting that a factor in the persuasiveness of an opinion is “whether the
opinion was unanimous or only the prevailing side of a split vote”).  
66. But see WAMBAUGH, supra note 1, at 100 (“[I]t would be inevitable and right that a
court would attach weight to the well-considered opinion of any court composed of learned
men.”); see also id. at 96 n.2.
67. See Jeremy Waldron, “Partly Laws Common to All Mankind”: Foreign Law in
judge on a three-judge panel may be less persuasive than an opinion that
garners unanimity.65
Again, we can minimize the actual difference these variances may make.
Law review articles usually go through a process of review and revision and
must (if they are any good) anticipate objections to their position.  The process
of having to defend an article may, in some instances, mimic the effect of the
adversarial process and the obligation to win a majority for one’s opinion.
Also, a conscientious scholar will be interested not merely in the abstract
theoretical virtues of her legal positions but in their practical consequences and
their workability.  Both of these things are true, and they show again how, in
various contingent circumstances, a well written law review article will be
more persuasive than a court opinion.  But again we are only dealing now in
tendencies.  And given legal procedures and constraints, the tendency may be
that a court’s decision will be more persuasive to another court than a law
review article more times than not.  A judge may have to actually win votes for
his or her position; a law review author need only convince a journal to
publish her piece.
Further, note how this last tendency speaks not only to the fact that court
decisions will be more relevant than law review articles or treatises most of the
time, but that they actually may be better because they are the outcome of a
process with constraints—hearing both sides of an argument and having to
render a decision that can accommodate those arguments (or at least address
them).  This is not a claim that judges will be smarter than the average
academic.   Rather, it is a claim that there are structural features of court66
systems that will make their decisions possibly more compelling, simply as a
matter of presentation and argument, to other courts.  By this time, I should not
need to emphasize again that I am talking in tendencies, not in absolutes.  The
hypothesis I am now offering is that courts are more likely to be considered
“persuasive” both because they are more likely to be relevant, but also because
they are more likely to be well-reasoned or better argued or simply in a generic
sense more “persuasive” given the constraints of the legal way of doing
things.67
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American Courts, Colloquy at IILF Int’l Legal Theory Colloquim 46-47 (Jan. 17, 2008),
(transcript available at http://iilf.org/courses/documents/2008colloquium.session1.waldron.pdf)
(discussing the “lawyerly approach” as well as the “legal way”) [hereinafter Waldron, Partly
Laws].  
68. Indeed, there will even be distinctions between various courts being used as persuasive
authorities.  A recent court decision may be thought more persuasive than an older one.  A court
decision made by a higher level court may be thought to be more persuasive than the opinion
of a lower level court (if only because the higher court has the benefit of the lower court’s
decision).  Unanimous opinions will be more persuasive than majority opinions, etc.  I take
these examples from Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1201-02 (explaining the phenomenon he calls
“graded persuasiveness”).  
I said earlier that on the conventional way of looking at persuasive
authority, the category of persuasive authority is undifferentiated.  By that I
meant that there was no pure ranking of the sources of persuasive authority,
so that some authorities were automatically more persuasive than others.
Indeed, this would be contrary to the animating idea of the conventional
picture, which is that sources only have their authority to the extent that they
are persuasive.  And the “undifferentiated” thesis is that we cannot say, a
priori, that some sources will be more persuasive than others.  In some
contexts, a novel or a philosophy book will be more relevant and useful, and
hence, more persuasive than the decision of another court.  Nothing I have said
in this section has yet shown this to be false.
But the picture is, nonetheless, more complicated than this, because we can
point to tendencies that explain why citation to other courts will be more
frequent than citations to other authorities.  We can say, as a general matter,
that the decisions of other courts will be more relevant to courts because courts
are routinely faced with similar situations and will have to resolve
controversies using similar sorts of tools.  And we can even hazard that courts
have various checks and constraints that make their decision making better,
and hence, more helpful to other courts.  Again, these are generalizations.  But
they are generalizations that make the conventional picture more sophisticated,
while still staying within the conventional picture.  Nothing in what was said
above requires that due to these features courts must defer to courts outside of
their jurisdiction, or even that they have to refer to them at all.  Importantly,
I have not said in this section that some sources will be more persuasive than
others because of their pedigree.  I have only pointed to factors that show why
courts might in more cases than not be more persuasive; I have not said that
courts will be more persuasive merely because they are courts.  A badly
reasoned court decision will be less persuasive than a good law review article,
even though it is the product of a court that has had arguments presented to it
in an adversarial fashion and will have to produce an opinion that will win the
votes of a majority of judges.   This is how the conventional picture says it68
74 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:55
69. Wambaugh expresses this point well: “[T]hough each of the kinds of authority is called
by the one name, – simply authority, – every lawyer knows that as to authoritativeness . . . that
a decision of any court, however humble or remote, differs not only in degree but in kind from
a dictum or statement in a text book . . . .”  WAMBAUGH, supra note 1, at 109.
70. Michael Sinclair, Precedent, Super-Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 369
(2007).
71. Schauer, Authority, supra note 9, at 1946.
should be.  I want to suggest next that there are reasons for going beyond the
conventional picture.  
III. The Intrinsic Persuasiveness of Some Persuasive Authorities: From
Persuasive Authority to Super Persuasive Authority
In the previous Part, I tried as best I could to stay within the conventional
picture regarding persuasive authority, but at the same time attempted to give
that picture much more nuance.  That nuance included showing how some
authorities, namely courts, could be seen as generally more persuasive than
other authorities.  But is this all we can say about the authority of courts that
are outside of the jurisdiction of the deciding court?  If so, it would still be a
significant addition to the conventional wisdom.  It would show that the
conventional picture could be modified to depict a tier in sources of
authority—not an absolute one, but still one that seems to matter in the day-to-
day lives of courts.  
I do not think, however, that this is all we can say about why courts cite
other courts with a greater frequency than they do other persuasive sources.
And to get to this conclusion, we have to depart from the traditional picture,
which sees the authority of other courts as only persuasive authorities—that
is, authoritative only insofar as they actually persuade the deciding court with
their reasoning.  In this section, I will suggest that other courts can have an
authority just by virtue of being a court that decides, and not necessarily only
because a judicial decision’s reasoning is particularly persuasive.   We might69
consider these to be “super-persuasive” authorities, in a bow to the newly
discovered idea of “super-precedent.”   These authorities would have an70
additional weight, beyond their persuasiveness, just as super-precedents
supposedly have a greater weight than (mere) precedents.  We might wonder:
how could there be such sources?  But they exist, and I will argue that they are
a familiar part of the legal landscape.  
Of course, super persuasive authorities would still ultimately be optional
authorities—to use Frederick Schauer’s helpful term —because they are not71
binding in the sense that courts must follow them or risk being in legal error.
I will not be arguing that these super persuasive authorities must be cited by
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72. See the discussion of the “reasoning-borrowing approach” in Rebecca Zubaty, Foreign
Law and the U.S. Constitution: Delimiting the Range of Persuasive Authority, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1413, 1441 (2007).  As Zubaty notes, “For the purposes of the reason-borrowing approach, the
mere existence of a foreign law is relatively insignificant without understanding how it has been
enforced and whether the reasons for its enactment are transferable.”  Id. at 1454.  Here, I am
interested in how the “mere existence” of a foreign decision or law becomes significant.  
73. Jeremy Waldron has recently made a strong argument to this effect in the case of
foreign law.  My argument in many respects mirrors his.  But here I am not primarily interested
in the foreign context.  See Waldron, Partly Laws, supra note 67.  I am greatly indebted to these
lectures in what follows, although, as will be clear, I go from the inside out (from domestic
cases to foreign ones), whereas Waldron’s focus is almost entirely on foreign cases.     
other courts.  But I will suggest that some persuasive authorities do have an
authority ordinarily thought to be held only by mandatory authorities.  Courts
who looked to other courts as being “super persuasive” not only borrow
reasons from the other court, but also looking to that court’s status as a court
as a factor influencing their decision making.   In this respect, I hope to show72
that the power of courts as persuasive authorities sometimes more closely
approximates the pull that the past decisions of the same court can have, or
even a higher court: they are authorities by virtue of what they are, and not
(only) by virtue of what they say.   73
I proceed in this section by the use of three main examples of courts acting
as super persuasive authorities.  What these examples share is that they are
each instances of courts citing other courts because they are courts, which
brings the citation of these courts into territory outside of conventional
persuasive authorities.  In general, they cite other courts because they are
trying to make their decisions consistent with the decisions of those other
courts.  Why this is thought to be necessary in any given case will differ.  But
we can say, as a general matter, that sometimes courts will want to harmonize
their decisions in other courts either because (1) there is some right answer for
courts facing the question, and disagreement between courts implies that at
least one court is wrong; (2) there is some independent good achieved by
uniformity with other courts, such as stability or predictability across
jurisdictional lines; or (3) because not to reach the same result as another court
would be to fail to treat “like cases alike” on some relevantly similar factual
situation, thus violating the legal principle of fairness.  
I am getting ahead of the argument, however.  To set up the argument, we
need some concrete examples.  When does the court of another jurisdiction
have authority just by virtue of being another court?  I isolate three instances:
First, when circuit courts cite other circuit courts, not merely for their
informational or persuasive value, but because they seek to avoid a circuit
split; second, when state courts aim to harmonize their interpretation of state
“uniform acts” with other states based on the fact that those other states have
76 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:55
74. 610 F.2d 538, 541 (1979).
75. As Matt Hall has pointed out to me, however, the existence of a circuit split might
ultimately end up creating a firmer unity in the law, by encouraging the Supreme Court to step
in and resolve the matter.
adopted the same uniform act; and third, in common law decisions, when
states seek to harmonize their doctrines with the judicially crafted doctrines of
other states.  In the concluding Part of my Article, I briefly discuss a fourth,
and much more controversial example: when United States domestic courts
(either state or federal) cite to the decision of foreign courts.  I will argue that
the case of citing foreign courts is an instance, perhaps an extreme instance,
of the familiar practice of relying on other courts as “super persuasive”
authorities.
A. Circuit Courts Citing Other Circuit Courts
One obvious example of courts being more than merely persuaded by other
courts is the case of circuit splits among the United States Courts of Appeals.
It is commonplace, too familiar even to notice, for circuit courts to survey the
decisions of other circuit courts on a similar issue before reaching their own
decision.  Here, the fact that another court in a different circuit—and therefore
not a court in the same jurisdiction as the one deciding the matter—has ruled
in one way becomes a relevant data point for the court considering the same
issue.  It seems that the mere fact that there is another circuit that has ruled on
the issue makes its decision worthy of consideration, and not only because of
the content of what was said.  
The ususal and rather familiar reason for this practice is the desirability of
maintaining unity among the various circuits.  A particularly strong statement
of the rationale for the practice of circuit courts citing one another can be
found in Aldens, Inc. v. Miller:
Although we are not bound by another circuit’s decision, we
adhere to the policy that a sister circuit’s reasoned decision
deserves great weight and precedential value.  As an appellate
court, we strive to maintain uniformity in the law among the
circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow, thus avoiding
unnecessary burdens on the Supreme Court docket.  Unless our . . .
courts of appeals are thus willing to promote a cohesive network of
national law, needless division and confusion will encourage
further splintering and the formation of otherwise unnecessary
additional tiers in the framework of our national court system.  74
In other words, circuit courts must be especially attentive to the decisions of
their other circuit courts because to fail to do so would risk disunity.   This75
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76. Circuit courts make no bones about the fact that they try to avoid circuit splits.  See,
e.g., Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 980 (8th Cir. 2005) (“By
adopting the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Smith, our decision today avoids a circuit split.”);
Christina A. ex rel. Jennifer A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 997 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Finally, a
finding that the plaintiff class was a prevailing party avoids a circuit split with the Eleventh
Circuit.”); Torre v. Brickey, 278 F.3d 917, 919 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We agree with the Tenth
Circuit’s analysis and follow it in order to avoid an inter-circuit split.”); see also United States
v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting the majority’s
“Sisyphean attempt to avoid a second circuit split”).
77. This intuition may be flawed, however.  Should we automatically presume that there
is one intention behind every piece of legislation?  See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity,
94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1575 (2008).  
78. See id. at 1575 (“The emphasis on uniformity is most visible in the Supreme Court’s
self-selected docket, which is dominated by cases raising issues over which the lower courts
disagree.”). 
risk of disunity provides circuit courts with an extra reason to be attentive to
the decisions of their sister circuits, above and beyond the cogency of their
reasoning.    76
Two caveats must immediately be stressed about the present example.  First,
the fact that a court in a different circuit has ruled one way does not mean that
all the circuits have to rule that way; indeed, even if every other circuit has
ruled one way, this does not mandate the outcome for the remaining circuit.
Second, the decisions of courts in other circuits on other matters can also be
used for their purely persuasive value: they can be referred to because they are
well-reasoned, for instance.  And they often are.  All I am trying to point out
is that there is a presumption that circuit splits are a bad thing and that
disharmony between the circuit courts is to be avoided.  A consensus among
other circuits on a relevantly similar matter is, as a matter of practice, entitled
to some weight.  The mere fact that other circuit courts have decided a matter
one way is relevant.  It exerts a pull towards that result—not an inexorable
pull, but a pull nonetheless.
Why is this?  Consider the case of circuit courts divided over the
interpretation of a federal statute.  There is a intuitive presumption that the
statute only has one correct interpretation and that division in interpretation
shows that someone must be wrong.   In addition, a circuit split invites review77
by the Supreme Court, which will determine the correct interpretation for all
the circuits.   Thus, circuits might want to avoid splits because (1) a split78
shows that at least one of the circuits is wrong about the meaning of the
relevant law, and (2) the circuits want to avoid review and possible correction
by the Supreme Court.  These are external factors pushing circuit courts to pay
attention to courts in other circuits.  But be that as it may, they are reasons for
courts to pay attention to courts as courts, not for them to pay attention to the
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79. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 183 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating
that the primary responsibility of Supreme Court “is to ensure the integrity and uniformity of
federal law”); see also H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 251 (1991) (acknowledging that a circuit split is “probably the single
most important criterion” in deciding whether to grant certiorari).    
80.  This may make the example seem more like the case where a district court is bound
by the decisions of the relevant circuit court. 
content of the courts’ reasoning (at least from this perspective).  To that extent,
these external factors make other courts “super persuasive” authorities in a
fashion that actually permits them to serve more like mandatory authorities:
other courts are forced to be concerned about the decisions of other courts just
because they are the decisions of other courts.  This is because, to hazard a
more abstract explanation, the courts are striving for unity in interpretation of
(in our example) a federal statute.
But this example might seem a bit of a cheat.  In cases where circuit courts
cite one another for more than their mere persuasive value, the Supreme Court
is acting as the de facto unifier.   In following other circuits, a circuit court is79
in a sense merely anticipating the actions of the Supreme Court, and the
authority of the Supreme Court is binding on the circuits.  Other circuits are
not being viewed as authorities in their own right, but merely as reflections of
what the ultimate authority—i.e., the Supreme Court—might say.   In this80
way, the Supreme Court unites all the circuits, and gives them the role of
checking on one another.  The different circuits are not wholly separate
jurisdictions, the objection runs, because they are all under the ultimate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
This is a fair objection, but does not diminish entirely the force of the
example and the point I want to make.  Even though the quasi-mandatory
authority of other courts in other circuits may be merely an authority borrowed
from the ultimate authority of the Supreme Court, it is still a sort of authority
that nearly all persuasive authorities do not have.  A law review article does
not get any additional force by being a law review article: the only force it has
is the power to persuade.  But courts in other circuits, once they have ruled on
an issue, have given other courts something to consider merely by virtue of the
fact that another circuit court has rendered a decision on that issue.  There is
a pull towards conformity with other courts, and courts who drift from that
pull are usually thought to have to explain why, or at least to acknowledge the
disagreement.  A court is not obligated in any way to respond to even an
exceptionally compelling law review article or book.  
The practice could have developed otherwise; it could have been the case
that uniformity was not valued among circuits, and so circuit splits would not
be viewed as prima facie bad because there might be a good in the diversity
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81. See, in this regard, the interesting argument by Frost that circuit splits are not bad and
that currently we “overvalue” uniformity by seeking to eliminate them.  Frost, supra note 59,
at 1605-06; see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1173 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that
different interpretation among different circuits “allows experimentation with different
approaches to the same legal problem”).    
82. That is, the legislature is saying, “We do not really know what our Uniform Act means
until we see what the Uniform Acts of other states have been construed to mean.  Look at those,
and then figure out what we mean; and in looking at the other courts, try your best (within
reason) to make our law uniform with theirs.” 
XXSee, e.g., People ex rel. LeGout v. Decker, 586 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ill. 1992) (“To further
the goal of uniformity in such laws, courts generally defer to decisions of other states and will
construe the statute in accordance with the construction given to the same statute in other
jurisdictions.”); Lake Motor Freight Inc. v. Randy Trucking Inc. 455 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1983) (“To further the goal of uniformity in such laws courts generally defer to decisions
of other states and will construe the statute in accordance with the construction given to the
same statute in other jurisdictions.”); State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Iowa 1999)
(“Although the interpretation placed on this statute by other states is not binding on us, a review
of interpretation of federal laws.   It is significant that the practice could have81
been otherwise because it shows the extent to which uniformity (agreement
between circuits) is being sought as a good in its own right and not merely
simply by force of judicial fiat or the presumed will of the national legislature.
The desire to create an actual uniformity in the law transforms some
authorities into “super persuasive” ones.  
Note, finally, that it is important that circuit courts actually make the law in
their circuit.  The good of uniformity across the circuits can only be achieved
by coordinating with other real, live judicial authorities and not with mere
suggestions and hypotheses in law reviews.  So here is where it matters that
some persuasive authorities are actually authoritative (that is, they have
authority in a jurisdiction), rather than merely persuasive and rhetorical like
law journal articles.  The only way we can get uniformity in a circuit (in a
nation, in a world) is by matching up with the actual governing law of another
jurisdiction.  In addition to the considerations adduced in the previous part
about how having to actually make a decision may improve the reasoning of
a court, we can say: it is only by looking to the decisions that have been laid
down by another court and that really are the law that a circuit court can hope
to achieve the good of uniformity across circuits.   
B. Uniform Acts
Now consider another example, one which removes the Supreme Court as
an ultimate arbiter, and Congress as the author of laws: state courts
interpreting their own state’s enactment of a uniform act.  Here again, state
courts will be inclined to look to the interpretation of other courts in order to
determine how they should interpret the uniform act.   The uniform act, after82
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of decisions from other jurisdictions is instructive in light of the legislature’s goal of achieving
uniformity with states adopting the uniform act.”); Gallaudet Univ. v. Nat’l Soc’y of the
Daughters of the Am. Revolution, 699 A.2d 531, 549 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (“Finally, we
are mindful of the notion that Maryland courts, when construing Uniform Acts, should generally
seek uniformity with decisions of other states construing the same law.”); Spaeth v. Srinivasan,
959 A.2d 290, 294 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (“In applying and construing this uniform
act, consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to
its subject matter among states that enact it.”).
83. Or a real ABA Committee acting as an imaginary legislature.  
all, was designed to bring some uniformity in a certain area of law, and state
courts will try to sustain this uniformity even across jurisdictional lines.   
Like the previous example, this is a bit of a cheat.  There is still some body,
in this case either the state legislature itself or an imagined national
legislature  (the presumed “author” of a national act) that is imposing83
uniformity.  And courts are deferring to either their own state legislature’s
desire for uniformity or an imagined legislature and its intention to impose
uniformity across the states by “enacting” a uniform law.  The “pull” of the
decisions of other state courts is being derived from these extrinsic forces.  
But note that in this case, unlike in the previous example, there is no
national body that actually exists to impose that unity.  Even the state
legislature can only declare its intention that the act be uniform across states.
But in the process of trying to achieve this unity, state courts will treat the
decision of the other state courts interpreting a uniform act as authoritative, not
necessarily because of the cogency of their interpretation (though they also
may also treat them as authoritative in this way), but because they are state
courts that have decided in one way rather than another.  Looking to other
states that have adopted the uniform act in these cases is looking to them not
merely in their capacity as reasoners, but also in their capacity simply as courts
deciding cases one way rather than another way.  And this is a type of
authority that purely persuasive authorities are not meant to have.  They are
not supposed to have an authority, even if it is a borrowed authority, that
derives from their capacity as courts simply deciding. 
So far we have looked at two examples of court decisions having an
authority that goes beyond being merely “persuasive” because other courts
may look to those decisions and cite them, not because of the content of the
courts’ reasoning, but merely because courts made the decisions.  However,
in both of these cases, the authority could be seen as derivative.  In the circuit
court example, courts from other circuits may get a derived authority from the
possibility that they might follow the circuit that the Supreme Court will
uphold.  In the case of a state uniform act, the state courts interpreting the act
in conformity with other state courts are really looking to the authority of the
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84. Cass Sunstein and Eric Posner have recently discussed in great detail the phenomena
of state courts citing other state courts, but they do not focus on the pull towards uniformity as
one of the reasons for the citation practice.  Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of
Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 142 (2006).  Instead, they emphasize the possibility that
when a number of courts have ruled one way on an issue, those decisions have a “high
probability of being correct.”  Id.; see also Comment, State Law as “Other Law”: Our Fifty
Sovereigns in the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1671 (2007).   
XXI am not interested here in the prospect that more courts deciding one way rather than
another is an indicator of truth, because I am not certain that it is, and citing other courts
because of the truth value of what they say is being persuaded for a substantive, and not a
formal reason.  That is, one is being persuaded to decide a certain way because so many courts
have thought x, so they must be right; one is not being persuaded by the mere fact that many
courts have thought x.  It is the latter phenomenon I am most interested in.  
XXConsider the difference between being persuaded to listen to Elvis because “Elvis has
millions of fans, and that many people could not be wrong about the quality of his music,” and
being persuaded to listen to Elvis because “a lot of people listen to his music, and I just like
going along with the crowd.”  The latter judgment is independent of any judgment about the
quality of Elvis’s music.  Cf. ELVIS PRESLEY, 50,000,000 ELVIS FANS CAN’T BE WRONG (RCA
Victor 1958). 
85. See, e.g., Samuelson v. Lord, Aeck & Sergeant, Inc., 423 S.E.2d 268, 272 n.2 (Ga. App.
1992) (“This result is consistent with the general trend in other states toward abolishing the
privity requirement for negligence actions against architects involving personal injury and
replacing it with the rule of foreseeability.”); Gratzle v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 613 N.E.2d
802, 804 (Ill. App. 1993) (“The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted their comparable statute
to include assumption of risk, and other similar modified comparative negligence statutes and
court decisions from other States indicate a trend toward abolishing the distinctions between
different types of fault in the context of negligence verdict setoffs.”); Russell v. Striker, 635
N.W.2d 734, 739 (Neb. 2001) (“As we noted in Wheeler, there has been a ‘strong, if not
overwhelming, recent trend away from the blindfold rule in comparative negligence states.’”);
Dirksing v. Blue Chip Architectural Prods., Inc., 653 N.E.2d 718, 730 (Ohio App. 1994) (“[T]he
trend in most states, including Ohio, is to apply exclusivity provisions expansively to bar any
negligence claim, even those of third parties, against a complying employer.”); H.E. Butt
state legislature that passed the act.  In both cases, there was a move towards
unity with other courts, just for the sake of being in unity with them—but this
move towards conformity may be artificially forced, either because of the
Supreme Court’s ultimate say or the commands of the state legislature.
C. State Common Law
But we need not look much further to find purer examples of states looking
to other courts as authorities because they seek to be in unity with those other
courts for reasons other than simply a belief that those other courts ruled
correctly.   In interpreting common law cases, state courts will frequently look84
to other states, and especially trends in other states, to see how they should
decide tort cases.  This especially seems to be the case when it comes to rules
regarding negligence.85
82 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:55
Grocery Co. v. Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22, 27 (Tex. 1988) (“Today, there is a clear trend, among
the comparative negligence states that have considered the issues, to permit the jury to know
the ultimate effect of its percentage findings.” (citation omitted)); Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co.,
746 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Wash. 1987) (“The modern trend followed by a majority of states is to
impose liability only upon a showing of negligence by either the aircraft owner or operator.”).
For an especially clear instance of a state court observing and then choosing to follow the trend
of other states, see Sowinski v. Walker, 198 P.3d 1134, 1153 (Alaska 2008) (“A reexamination
of the persuasive precedents from Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Florida on which Loeb
relied reveals a general erosion of support for the position we adopted in Loeb.  A broader
canvassing of jurisdictions confirms that our holding in Loeb now represents the minority
view.” (footnote omitted)).
86. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 84.
87. So, too, might Restatements be valuable as guides for states who seek uniformity in a
certain area of law.  Among persuasive authorities, Restatements may be the closest to being
“super persuasive,” precisely because of their role in acting as a potential unifier of the law
across jurisdictions. 
88. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 349 (2008) (emphasis added).  
Of course one reason courts will look to other courts on common law
matters is that consensus may be, in their opinion, indicative of truth.   But86
another reason may be that uniformity across state lines may be an
independently good thing that states will want to achieve.  And the only way
to achieve this harmonization is to give some weight—but not necessarily an
absolute weight—to other state courts and to follow the direction that their
decisions are trending in a certain area.  When courts seek uniformity and look
to other state courts to determine what that uniformity should look like, they
are using the authority of those courts in a way that goes beyond being merely
“persuasive.”  They are treating them as authorities by virtue of what they are,
not only by what they say, and hence as “super persuasive.”   87
Moreover, in this case, there is no further authority—whether it be the
Supreme Court or a state legislature—that lends its authority to the other
courts.  There is only the pull of the good of unity (or uniformity) itself that
binds courts to other courts not in the same jurisdiction.  As Richard Posner
puts it, this is the case when 
[a]part from the intrinsic persuasiveness of the decision, just the
fact that it is a decision by such a court carries some weight.  If
many sister courts have converged on a particular rule or doctrine,
the fact of convergence will push a court confronted with the
question for the first time toward the same result unless it has
strong contrary feelings.88
Or, as an older source puts it, “It is inevitable that jurisdictions practising
similar systems of law should wish their systems to be harmonious with one
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89. WAMBAUGH, supra note 1, at 100.
90. See, e.g., id. at 97 (“[C]ertainly every one perceives without argument that uniformity
is essential to law.”).  
91. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than it be settled right.”).
92. Evan Camkinker emphasizes the same value in arguing against circuit splits:
“[N]ational uniformity of federal law ensures that similarly situated litigants are treated equally;
this is considered a hallmark of fairness in a regime committed to the rule of law.”  Evan H.
Camkinker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court
Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 (1994).
93. See Waldron, Partly Laws, supra note 67.  
another.”   Here, it is simply the bare desire for conformity that leads state89
courts to cite one another, and to agree with them—not the external pressure
of a Supreme Court, or of a real or imagined legislature.  
D.  Why Uniformity?
This pull towards conformity, present to a greater or lesser extent in all
three examples cited above, should not strike us as a foreign or mysterious
value in law—far from it.   In addition to the above instances, uniformity is90
at the core of the doctrine of stare decisis.  Stare decisis seeks uniformity
across time and recognizes that there is a good to stability and uniformity in
the same court.  It is good that legal expectations be settled, and it is a legal
imperative that like cases be treated alike, perhaps even at the risk of a
substantive injustice.   A court that simply disregarded its past decisions91
would disturb legitimately formed expectations, and it would also introduce
unfairness, showing its rules to be arbitrary and ad hoc.   Uniformity acts as92
a meta-constraint on a deciding court, but it is a constraint informed by
substantive values that are uniquely legal.  A court may, and should, decide
each case on the merits.  But it also must look at its own past and make sure
that it is deciding each case in conformity with its own past.  There is no
mystery here in the bare legal value of uniformity, or as we might also put it,
of consistency.93
If stare decisis involves a uniformity across time, then the citation of other
courts as authorities involves uniformity across space with other courts.  In the
same way that a court looks to its own past decisions to try to bring its present
self into conformity with its past self, courts may look to other courts to make
their decisions congruent with one another.  To be sure, courts do not have to
cite other courts, or bring their own caselaw into conformity with the law of
other circuits, or of other states.  But neither is stare decisis an “inexorable
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94. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (stating that stare decisis is a “principle
of policy” and not an “inexorable command”).  
95. See, e.g., PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc. v. C.I.R. 503 F.3d 119, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(stating that avoiding a circuit split is particularly important in a case “involving federal tax law,
where ‘uniformity among the circuits is particularly desirable . . . to ensure equal application
of the tax system,’ . . . and to further maintain consistency” (internal citation omitted)).  
96. Cf. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 84, at 135-36 (emphasizing the relationship of
consensus to truth, and suggesting that “if the majority of states believe that X is true, there is
reason to believe that X is in fact true”).
97. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178-79 (1986).
98. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984); see also, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 70, at 369.
99. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 84, at 149.  Jeremy Waldron seems to take it as a
given that if two laws “are not administered by a single over-arching entity, then we cannot
complain that anyone has treated like cases in a disparate way.  The cases have been treated
differently, but no one or no system has violated the precept: ‘Treat like cases alike.’”  Jeremy
Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 185, 193 (2008).  I am not sure this is
command” : an old decision can be overturned if it is no longer applicable, if94
circumstances have changed, or if few people rely on the decision any longer.
All of these are relevant considerations.  But they do not stop stare decisis
from dictating that the past decision of a court is something that the court
should consider and assign weight.  In a like manner, some court decisions
may not always be very persuasive.  The decisions of even a majority of courts
can be wrong, and not useful, and should be departed from.  Nonetheless, the
decisions of other courts may deserve recognition and even consideration if the
cases are very closely related or on point, and there are strong reasons for
uniformity or consistency in that area of law.   95
Indeed, the more courts that have decided a matter in a certain way, the
greater weight those decisions may be said to have, and not necessarily
because consensus is a measure of truth.   The reason decisions from other96
jurisdictions might deserve recognition is the same as the reason that the past
decisions of the same court deserve recognition: to achieve uniformity to avoid
the appearance of a checkerboard of legal principle across jurisdictions.   The97
same values of settling expectations and of treating like cases alike are as
much at play between courts as they are within the same courts.  As one court
put it, courts have an obligation to “promot[e] predictability and stability
through satisfaction of mutual expectations.”   There is no a priori reason why98
this interest in predictability and stability should stop at jurisdictional borders.
The only difference (and it is a major one) is that it may be harder to see
cases as “similar” across jurisdictions, and so it may be harder to see
uniformity across jurisdictions as a good to be achieved, because it is simply
not a good to be had.  There may be different laws, even different legal
traditions, across jurisdictions.   And this will prevent exactly similar cases99
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true; moreover, I am not sure it is consistent with Waldron’s other work on the jus gentium.  Cf.
Waldron, Partly Laws, supra note 67.  
100. See Nicholas Rosenkranz, Condorcet and the Constitution, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1281,
1301 (2007) (“In short, the Constitution itself furnishes an answer to whether it should be
interpreted by reference to foreign law.  It evinces a clear vision that most questions of law and
policy are inherently local.”).
101. Frank Cross and Les Green suggest this analogy in their reply to a blog posting by
Richard Posner.  See Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog: Citing Foreign Courts, Comments of
Frank Cross & Les Green, http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2004/12/citing_foreign_html#
comments (last visited Apr. 17, 2009).   
102. See the interesting argument in Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1479, on this possibility.
from springing up across jurisdictions.  It will tend to diminish the possibility
that there was any uniformity of expectations to be preserved across the
jurisdictions in the first place.  Even among states in the United States, there
will be a diversity of laws and legal cultures, and a court’s duty should be to
attend to the distinctiveness of its own jurisdiction.  Moreover, uniformity is
not a good above all else.  The point that some make in objecting to the
citation of foreign authorities has special weight when it is made in this spirit,
emphasizing differences and distinctiveness, and opposing an unthinking
uniformity achieved by following other courts.  100
However strong this point, and it is strong, it does not prevent us entirely
from seeing the past decisions of the same court and relevant decisions of
other courts as, at times, merely a matter of degree, and not as absolute
difference in kind.  A past decision of the same court may be so poorly
reasoned or so out of date that the past decision is like one of another country,
not having any real pull on the court.   It may not even deserve consideration101
in the court’s decision; it may even be ignored.   But at the other extreme, it102
may be that there is no compelling reason not to treat a case from another
jurisdiction exactly like the case before the court.  To do so would be morally
arbitrary.  In both cases, the “pull” that stare decisis or a particular persuasive
authority can exert on the court is not irresistable: persuasive authorities can
be disagreed with or distinguished, past decisions of the same court can be
overruled.  But in both cases, the pull exists not only towards the intrinsic
persuasiveness of an authority but also toward uniformity in the law, and the
good that uniformity brings and embodies (such as stability, reliability, and
fairness).  If this is right, then it shows how consensus among courts of
different jurisdictions might be a good thing, and specifically a good thing
legally—that is, it realizes a good internal to law.  
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103. See the helpful discussion on this point in Ann-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1112, n.36 (2000).
104. See Waldron, Partly Laws, supra note 67.  
105. See Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1147 (1993), for a particularly strong statement of this position.
106. Vicki Jackson points to this idea in some of her work.  She argues that “[r]eferences to
transnational sources may relate not only to the place of the court’s nation in the community of
nations, but also to the status and relationship of courts to each other in the development of the
law, thus fostering an autonomous professionalism of independent courts.”  Vicki C. Jackson,
Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality, 37 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 271, 283 (2003) (emphasis added); see also id. at 280 (speaking of the “joint
venturing” implicit in the citation of other courts as persuasive authority); id. at 305 n.119
(noting the “sense of obligation” judges feel to judges in other foreign courts as “an obligation
to the law”); Waters, supra note 3, at 638–39 (describing the increasing dialogue between
domestic and foreign courts and the emergence of a “world community of courts”). 
107. For an instance of like cases influencing an opinion, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
IV. Conclusion: The Real Debate Over Foreign Authorities
The case of citation to foreign authorities is perhaps the limiting case of the
good of unity—if it is even an instance of that at all.  How can unity have a
pull between jurisdictions governed by different law, connected by no higher
authority?  How can there be a comity of courts that would somehow
transcend the comity of the nation?   How can we see various courts of103
different nations as engaged in a “common enterprise” of crafting a uniform
law between nations?   In the case of diverse circuit court rulings, we still104
have the sense that the states are part of a national system, ultimately subject
to the Federal Constitution.  We may even retain that sense with state courts,
who nonetheless serve separate sovereigns.   They may be separate, but they105
still interconnect as part of the United States.  How could there be a unity of
expectations that unites different countries?  At this point, there is no higher
body to govern them, but only the legal pull of unity itself: the idea that courts,
whatever sovereign they work under, are part of a common judicial enterprise.
Those who support the citation of foreign courts point to the existence of a
transnational “judicial community.”  They point to globalization and the
increasing socialization of judges of different countries.   They are, in fact,106
arguing for a greater unity in the law.  
We are now in a position to contextualize this claim.  Those who support
the citation of foreign authorities are claiming, in part, that there is a good case
to be made that, being part of this same judicial enterprise, courts simply qua
courts should aim towards increasing uniformity with other courts.  Why?  For
the same reasons that a court might want to be in conformity with its past self:
continuity, stability, and treating like cases alike.   We are back to those same107
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436, 489 (1966) (“Moreover, it is consistent with our legal system that we give at least as much
protection to these rights as is given in the [foreign] jurisdictions described.”).  
108. It may be easier to make the argument that reliance interests would compel uniformity.
See Les Green’s comment, supra note 101 (“I note in passing that [Posner’s] proposal that stare
decisis should depend on reliance interests makes it possible for foreign legal norms to become
binding on American judges.”). 
109. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 97, at ch. 7.  Waldron advances this claim in the context
of the citation of foreign law.  Waldron, Partly Laws, supra note 67.   The U.S. Supreme Court
has similarly invoked the value of integrity when speaking of stare decisis: “Stare decisis is the
preferred course because it . . . contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process.”  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).     
110. Dworkin usually speaks of judicial decisions having to “fit” with the legal practice of
the nation, not the world.  See Michael McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial
Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1269, 1272-73 (1997).  
values, although with the foreign courts, it becomes more difficult to make a
compelling case that there are expectations of continuity across jurisdictions
or that cases in different jurisdictions are really “alike.”   But it is not an108
impossible case to make, and it may be increasingly easier to make this case
as time goes on and as countries tend to become more intertwined and more
like one another.  We may come to see the values that we want preserved when
we refer to stare decisis (which Dworkin helpfully catalogs under the general
heading of “integrity” ) as values we also want preserved when we refer to109
courts in general.  To continue in the Dworkinian vein, one might wonder to
what extent the international community (and its courts) is the proper
community to which courts should be faithful in interpreting the law.   But110
I leave this debate to another occasion.
The point I wish to conclude with is that, once we realize that citations to
other courts may have a pull, even an “authority” that other merely persuasive
authorities lack, the debate over the citation of foreign courts and laws
becomes more interesting, and we begin to grasp what all the fuss is really
about.  On the one hand, those who favor the citation of foreign authorities are,
implicitly and perhaps without knowing it, asserting the similarity of foreign
and domestic courts.  They are saying that certain legal goods may emerge
from being in uniformity with those courts, and in so doing, they are saying
that the courts (foreign and domestic) are similar enough to make that
uniformity meaningful.  On the other hand, those who fear the citation of
foreign authorities have some legitimate basis for their worry.  As my
examples in Part III demonstrated, there are some uses of ostensibly
“persuasive authorities” that show them to have force beyond their mere
persuasiveness, so that they are “super persuasive.”  Those who question the
practice of citing foreign persuasive authorities may legitimately wonder
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whether the fact that foreign authorities are being used shows them to have a
pull on us that is greater than the intrinsic force of their reasoning.  Those who
fear this are not entirely unjustified in this fear, as in many cases, persuasive
authorities are being treated as more than merely persuasive.  
In short, once we grasp that persuasive authorities are of many types, and
that some authorities (namely courts and laws of other jurisdictions) can have
force beyond their persuasive value, the debate over the use of foreign
authorities becomes more focused and more interesting.  To what extent are
foreign and domestic courts similar, and thus, engaged in a similar project?
Is it an independently good thing to want our own courts to be in harmony
with courts from other jurisdictions? 
These are the types of substantive questions we should be asking.  It is my
hope that this essay has gone some of the way toward showing the stakes
involved in weighing the alternative answers and then choosing correctly
among them.
